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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
BRIAN BURNS,
BRIEF OF THE APPELLEE/
CROSS-APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

Case NO. 920708-CA
CANNONDALE BICYCLE COMPANY,
THE BICYCLE CENTER, and JOHN
DOES I THROUGH V,

Dist. Court No. 900901567

Category 15
Defendants/Appellees/
Cross-Appellants.
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
JUDGE HOMER WILKINSON
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a district court order granting a
Motion for Summary Judgment for The Bicycle Center ("BC") from the
Third District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2 (1992).
STATEMENT OF I8SUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The Plaintiff has stated the issues regarding his appeal in
his opening brief. BC sets forth the following issues regarding its
cross-appeal:
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1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting

Plaintiff's

motion

for

a

protective

order

with

respect to

Plaintiff's business records absent a showing of "good cause"?
2.

Is there an ethical obligation and/or duty on the court

and attorneys, as officers of the court, to disclose to the
appropriate agencies, information found in documents produced
during discovery which provide a prima facie case of violations of
the laws of the State of Utah?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES.
ORDINANCES, RULE8 AND REGULATIONS
The following rules and statutes are applicable to issues on
cross-appeal.
1.

Utah R. Civ, P. 26(c)(7) - Protective Orders:
(c) Protective Orders. Upon motion by a party or by the
person from whom discovery is sought, and for good cause
shown [emphasis added], the court in which the action is
pending or alternatively, on matters relating to a
deposition, the court in the district where the
deposition is to be taken may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from
annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or
expense, including one or more of the following:
(7) that a trade secret or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information not be disclosed
or be disclosed only in a designated way;
If the motion for a protective order is denied in whole
or in part, the court may, on such terms and conditions
as are just, order that any party or person provide or
permit discovery.
The provisions of Rule 37(a) (4)
apply to the award of expenses incurred in relation to
the motion.
2

2.

Utah Code Ann, 58-12-53(15) (1990), Unprofessional Conduct:
(15) Any conduct or practice, contrary to the recognized
standards of ethics of the chiropractic profession, or
any conduct or practice which does or might constitute a
danger to the health, welfare or safety of the patient or
public, or any conduct, practice or condition which does
or might impair the ability to practice chiropractic
safely and skillfully.

3.

Utah Code Ann, 58-12-52(1)(a) (1990);
(1)
The director of the division, upon the written
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in the
following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct;

4.

Utah Code Ann, 58-12-35(1)(a) (1990):
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of the
board, shall deny an application for a license to
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State
in the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good
moral
character
or
has
been
guilty
of
unprofessional conduct as defined in this Act:

5.

Utah Code Ann, 58-12-36(9) (1990):
"unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of
medicine includes:
(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine by one
not licensed or by one whose license is suspended; or
practicing as a partner-agent, or employee of , or in
joint venture with, any person who does not hold a
license to practice medicine within this State;

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a personal injury action wherein the Plaintiff, Dr.
Brian Burns, alleges that he sustained injury to his left wrist,
neck, lower back, and head as a result of a bicycle accident that
occurred on August 16, 1986. Plaintiff asserts that the Cannondale
bicycle manufactured

by

Defendant Cannondale

Bicycle Company

("CBC") that he was riding was defective, causing him to go over
the handlebars while he was traveling at approximately twenty-five
miles an hour on the bicycle. The bicycle was sold to him by BC.
Both defendants deny that the bicycle was, in any way, defective.
Both defendants assert that the accident occurred as a result of
Dr. Burn's conduct.

(R. 395).
RELEVANT FACTS OF THE CASE

BC is in agreement with the Plaintiff's statement of facts
with the exceptions and additions set-forth below:
STATEMENT OF DISPUTED FACTS
1.

BC repaired and discarded the defective parts which had

caused the malfunction. (Plaintiff's Brief, Page 6 f 6),
Response; This statement is nothing more than unsubstantiated
speculation.

Not only has Plaintiff failed to show any causal

relationship between the allegedly

"defective parts" and his

accident, but the Plaintiff has also failed to introduce any
admissible evidence which would demonstrate: (1) that there were
4

"defective parts" on the bicycle in question; or (2) that said
parts were "discarded" by BC.
2.

Mr. Blomquist admitted that a defect in the bicycle had

caused the accident. Plaintiff's Brief Page 8, Para. 12f Fn. 1.
Response; The Plaintiff incorrectly states that Mr. Blomquist
"admitted that a defect in the bicycle had caused the accident."
Conversely, it can only be said that Plaintiff claims that Mr.
Blomquist admitted to him during a conversation at BCfs store that
a "malfunction" in the bicycle had caused the accident. (R. 533).
More importantly,

BC's owner, Mr. Blomquist, testified

in his

deposition that "[t]here were no problems" with the bike when he
examined

it

after

the alleged

accident.

(R. 512-513

& 572).

Consequently, aside from Plaintiff's assertion that Mr. Blomquist
admitted to him that there was a "malfunction" in the bike, there
is no evidence in the record indicating:

(1) that there was a

specific defect in the bicycle or one of its components at the time
it was manufactured by Cannondale Bicycle Company ("CBC"); (2) that
there was a defect in the bicycle or one of its components at the
time

is was

assembled

by

BC;

or

(3)

that

the

accident

was

proximately caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect in the bike
or one of the components on the bike.

5

STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
1.

Although the accident complained of occurred on August

16, 1986, Plaintiff did not commence this action until August 16,
1989 (i.e, three years after the accident). (R. 005).
2.

From the date the Complaint was filed, both parties

participated in discovery through June 19, 1992, the date discovery
ceased by order of the trial court dated January 15, 1992. (R. 453454) .
3.

In bringing this action, the Plaintiff alleged that the

subject accident was caused by a defective and dangerous condition
in the front brake of his bicycle, to wit:
[T]he brake spring for the front brakes of the bicycle popped
off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front tire of the
bicycle. (R. 003) .
4.

In exploring the impact such a defect would have on the

bicycle, the expert consulted by the Plaintiff and his friend, Todd
Bradford, informed the Plaintiff and Mr. Bradford that the loss of
the front brake spring, as alleged by the Plaintiff in his
complaint, would have the opposite effect alleged, to wit: the loss
of the spring would cause the brakes to separate away from the rim
such that even if the spring had "popped off,11 it would not be a
probable cause of the accident. (R. 500).
5.

By way of an affidavit prepared and signed by Plaintiff's

attorney Edward T. Wells of Robert J. Debry and Assoc, and filed
with the trial court and served on defense counsel moments prior to

6

the

hearing

on

CBC's

and

BC's

motion

for

summary

judgment,

Plaintiff's counsel ignored the fact that Plaintiff's own expert
witness informed him that the brake was not a "probable cause" of
the accident.

Instead, Mr. Wells testified in his affidavit that:

Plaintiff is unable to file affidavits in opposition to
the pending summary judgment issues from expert witnesses
because the defective part which allegedly caused plaintiff's
injury is unavailable for inspection by an expert witness.
Plaintiff claims the defective part or parts were
discarded by defendant, The Bicycle Center, while acting as
agent for warranty repairs for defendant Cannondale Bicycle
Company.
Plaintiff has produced testimony to support the
spoliation claim, but due to the spoliation of evidence cannot
produce evidence of the actual defect.
(R. 590-591)(emphasis added).
6.

In the

Plaintiff's

deposition,

he

asserted

that he

sustained loss of income as a result of the bicycle accident in
excess of $250,000.

The defendants requested that the plaintiff

produce his business records, and those of Burns

Chiropractic

Clinic, Inc., in order to determine the accuracy of this claim.
The records were

formally

requested

from Dr. Burns through a

Request for Production of Documents.
7.

The records of Burns Chiropractic Clinic were obtained

using a Subpoena Duces Tecum.

Five pages were produced on October

7, 1991, by Dr. Burns' accountants, Sorensen, Chido & May, pursuant
to a Subpoena Duces Tecum served upon them on September 23, 1991.
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For the most part, the records that were the subject of the
Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order are financial records that
were produced on August 9, 1991, and September 12 f 1991.

The

documents produced on August 9, 1991, were produced pursuant to a
Request for Production of Documents sent to Dr. Burns.

The

documents produced on September 12, 1991, were produced pursuant to
the Subpoena Duces Tecum and Notice of Records of Deposition served
on the Burns Chiropractic Clinic, Inc. (R.397).
8.

The only stipulation reached regarding the protection of

information obtained through discovery is found in pages 124 and
125 of Dr. Burns' deposition. (R. 413-14).

In that stipulation,

counsel for the respective parties agreed that Dr. Burns' concept
of "working smarter," as outlined in the deposition, would be
included in a sealed portion of the deposition which would be kept
confidential and used only in this litigation only. Specifically,
the parties stipulated:
Mr. Hansen: Let's go back on the record then and let me
restate what I understand the agreement is. With respect to
the deposition from this point forward, it is agreed by all
counsel and the deponent that the deposition from this point
forward will be sealed with the exception of the employees of
State Farm, employees of Aetna Insurance, employees of the law
firm of Morgan & Hansen, employees of the law firm of
[Williams & Hunt]. (R. 421).
9.

As set-forth above, the terms o£ the stipulation entered

into by counsel during Plaintiff's deposition relate only to the
sealed portion of the deposition. No agreement or stipulation was
8

entered into with respect to the business records of Plaintiff or
his

business,

Burns

Chiropractic,

Inc.,

which

were

produced

pursuant to subsequent discovery requests by the defendants.
10.

At no time prior to October 29, 1991, did the Plaintiff

seek a protective order from the court regarding the financial
records Plaintiff is seeking to keep confidential. In fact, the
documents that Plaintiff seeks to keep confidential were produced
six to eight weeks prior to filing a Motion for Protective Order.
(R. 398).
11.

The

documents

that

the

Plaintiff

hopes

to

protect

establish a prima facie case of violation by Dr. Burns and Dr.
Robert Morrow, an orthopedic surgeon, licensed to practice medicine
in the State of Utah, of their respective professional licensing
standards.

The records further establish a prima facie case of

perjury on the part of Dr. Burns when compared with his
testimony.
12.

deposition

(R. 413-14).
Dr.

Burns

testified

that

he

had

no

fee-sharing

arrangement with Dr. Morrow. The documents show otherwise.
(R. 414) .
13.

Dr.

Morrow

is

an

orthopedic

surgeon

who

has

his

professional office in the same building as one of Dr. Burns1
chiropractic clinics and is, in fact, a treating physician for Dr.
Burns' in this case. (R. 398).
9

14.

After the documents were produced on September 12, 1991,

Plaintiff's counsel requested that defense counsel not disclose
those documents to anyone other than staff in defense counsel's
office working on the case, and clients. Defense counsel agreed to
do so in order to allow Plaintiff's counsel time to file a Motion
for Protective Order.
Therefore, based on the foregoing, BC disputes Plaintiff's
specific statements concerning the relevant facts of this case as
indicated above and further asserts that the additional facts
numbered,

1

through

14

above,

are

essential

to

a

proper

understanding of the issues advanced in Plaintiff's Brief and for
consideration of BC's cross-appeal.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The fact that BC's owner, Philip Blomquist, allegedly admitted
that a "malfunction" in the bike caused the

accident

does

not

preclude summary judgement because even if it is assumed, arguendo,
that such an admission was made, it does not provide the Plaintiff
with evidence whereby he can meet his burden of proof on the
specific elements of his products liability cause of action.
Consequently,

the trial

court properly

deemed

the alleged

admission to be "immaterial" in granting summary judgement in favor
of BC.
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Because
essentially

the

elements

of

a

product

liability

claim

are

identical to that of a breach of implied warranty

claim, the Plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate a genuine issue
of material fact with respect to his breach of implied warranty
claim and the summary judgement in favor of BC was proper.
The mere fact an accident has occurred does not, in and of
itself,

support

Consequently,

an

inference

because

there

that

a defendant

is no

evidence

was

that

negligent.

the

subject

bicycle, or any component thereon, was defective at the time of the
accident or that a defect was the proximate cause of the action,
there is no evidence to support Plaintifffs breach of express
warranty claim and negligent assembly claim.
Plaintiff's claim of evidence spoliation

is without merit

because: (1) there is no evidence BC knew of Plaintiff's claim and,
pursuant thereto, intentionally discarded evidence; (2) there is no
legal presumption of a defect when a repair person replaces a part
on a piece of equipment; (3) a repair person does not have a duty
to retain parts of equipment that are replaced when a product is
serviced; and (4) even if it is assumed, arguendo, that evidence
was discarded,

there

is no evidence

in the record

supporting

Plaintiff's products liability claim or his claim that the part
purportedly

discarded

was

material

Plaintiff's product liability claim.
11

to

the

establishment

of

The trial court erred in protecting the documents of the Burns
Chiropractic

Clinic,

Inc.,

because

the

Plaintiff

failed

to

demonstrate that there was "good cause" for the protective order.
Additionally, there is no support for the Plaintiff's conclusion
that the parties had stipulated to protect the documents during the
Plaintiff's deposition. During the deposition, the parties agreed
to seal a portion of the deposition. The parties did not agree that
all documents regarding the Plaintiff's business would not be
discoverable.
The Plaintiff waived his right to a protective order regarding
the documents involved because he produced the documents prior to
seeking the protective order. Rule 26(c), which the Plaintiff
relied upon before the trial court, contemplates that a protective
order will be sought before the documents are produced.
The documents sought to be protected reveal that Dr. Burns and
Dr. Morrow had a fee sharing arrangement. Such an arrangement
violates Utah professional licensing standards and could subject
both Dr. Burns and Dr. Morrow to discipline by the Utah Department
of Professional Licensing. The ethical standards accepted by both
attorneys and judges require that they report any unprofessional
conduct to the appropriate authorities. Moreover, these documents
call into question Dr. Burn's credibility since Dr. Burns testified
in his deposition that no such fee sharing arrangement existed.
12

ARGUMENT
POINT I
ALTHOUGH FACTS AND INFERENCES BEFORE THE COURT
ARE TO BE CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF THE PARTY OPPOSING SUMMARY
JUDGEMENT, THE MERE EXISTENCE OF ISSUES OF FACT DOES NOT
PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGEMENT: ISSUES OF FACT MUST BE MATERIAL TO THE
APPLICABLE RULE OF LAW
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
motion for summary judgment be granted only when there is "no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bowen v. Riverton Citv.
656 P.2d 434, 436 (Utah 1982). Where there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews the trial
court's conclusions of law for correctness. Dvbowski v. Ernest W.
Hahn. Inc., 775 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah App. 1989).
The Plaintiff contends that a genuine issue of material fact
exists in this case because, on the one hand, BC and CBC presented
experts who testified that defective front brakes on the bicycle
could not have caused the accident while, on the other hand, the
owner of BC allegedly admitted that a "malfunction" in the bike
caused the accident. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 15)
However, even if it is assumed, arguendo, that B C s owner
admitted that a "malfunction" in the bike caused the alleged
accident, such an admission does nothing to advance the Plaintiff's
personal injury action because such an admission does not provide
13

the Plaintiff with any evidence whereby he can meet his burden of
proof as to any specific element of his products liability claim.
A.

The Mere Existence of Issues of Fact Does Not Preclude gummary
Judgment: The Issues Must Be Material To The Cause of Action.
It has long been recognized by both federal and state courts

that the mere existence of issues of fact does not preclude summary
judgment if those issues do not pertain to an element essential to
the opposing party's case.

This important principle is most

eloquently set-forth in the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986), wherein the Court
stated:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates that
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential
to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be
"no genuine issue as to any material fact," since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.
Id. at 322-23 (emphasis added).
In interpreting
Procedure, which

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil

follows

the

federal

version

of Rule 56(c)

verbatim, the Utah Supreme Court held in Horgan v. Industrial
Design Corp.. 657 P.2d 751 (Utah 1982), that:
[T]he mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as
a whole does not preclude the entry of summary judgment if
those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case.
14

Id. at 752 (emphasis added).
Elaborating on the standard set-forth in Horgan, the Utah
Supreme Court stated in Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah
1983), that:
Although the facts and the inferences from the facts properly
before the court are to be construed in favor of the opponent
on a motion for summary judgment, the mere existence of issues
of fact does not preclude summary judgment. The issues of
fact must be material to the applicable rule of law.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
B.

Evidence Of A Malfunction Is Immaterial In Context of a
Products Liability Action Because The Plaintiff Must Prove, By
A Preponderance Of The Evidence, That A Dangerous And
Defective Condition Existed When The Plaintiff Purchased The
Product.
In order to state a Prima Facie case for products liability

against BC, the Plaintiff must show that his injuries were "caused"
by

a

defective

and

unreasonably

dangerous

condition

in

the

Cannondale SR-600 (the "Bike") or, more specifically, the Diacomp
400 front brake (the "Brake") on the Bike.

Section

402A of the

Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was specifically adopted by
the Utah Supreme Court in Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d
(Utah 1979), states, in pertinent part:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his
property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer . . .
Similarly,

the

Utah

Product

plaintiff prove that a "defect
15

Liability

or defective

Act

requires

condition

the

in the

product" existed at the time it was "sold by the manufacturer or
initial seller." Utah Code Ann. §78-15-6 (1992).
Pursuant thereto, the Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint that
the Bike was defective because "the brake spring for the front
brake popped off, causing the brakes to clamp down on the front
tire of the bicycle" which in turn "caused the bicycle to stop
immediately". (R. 003). However, after three years of discovery,
the record is devoid of any evidence substantiating Plaintiff's
allegations.
For example, despite alleging that the brake spring "popped
off," the Plaintiff admitted in his answers to interrogatories that
he did not see this happen, but instead stated that "I feel that
there was a defect in the front brakes due to the fact that I went
over the handle bars so abruptly. (R. 156)."
Of those persons who inspected the bicycle following the
accident, (i.e. Plaintiff's friend and associate, Todd Bradford,
and Philip Blomquist, the owner of BC) , neither indicated that the
front brake spring had popped off, was missing, or was otherwise
broken. Conversely, Mr. Bradford stated that he could not identify
a specific defect in the bike because "I'm not a bike professional,
or expert . . .M1 and Mr. Blomquist testified that the Brake spring

R. 542.
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had not "popped off" because it was on the Bike when he examined it
after the accident.

Specifically, Mr. Blomquist testified:

Q.
Do you recall any conversation where you mentioned
to him that you felt the spring had not worked properly
or had broken and that was the cause of the calipers
crimping down on the tire or wheel?
A.
I remember conversations to that nature, but I don't
recall the spring being — I know the soring wasn't broken.
In fact, there is no way it was broken, because I wouldn't
have had a spring to replace it with.

Q.
So, that the brake assembly was never changed on the
bike?
A.

Correct.

Q.
So, that brake assembly, as we are sitting there looking
at the bike, was the same one that was on the bicycle at the
time of the accident?
A.

Correct.

(R. 499 & 512-513)(emphasis added).
Although

Plaintiff

admitted,

by

way

of

his

attorney's

affidavit, that he "cannot produce evidence of the actual defect"
(R. 591), he tried to overcome this defect and avoid summary
judgement by arguing that a genuine issue of material fact existed
because BC's owner, Philip Blomquist, allegedly admitted to the
Plaintiff that there was a "malfunction" in the bike.2

2

However,

In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that Mr. Blomquist
indicated to him that "[t]here was a malfunction, in essence, of
the front braking system that caused the accident. (R. 533) .
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even if it is assumed, arguendo. that Mr. Blomquist admitted that
a

"malfunction"

caused

the

accident,

such

an

admission

is

immaterial in the context of BC's summary judgement motion because
a

malfunction

is

not

the

equivalent

unreasonably dangerous" condition.

of

a

"defective

and

A "malfunction" occurs when

something "functions badly or imperfectly."

The definition of

"defective" is "falling below the accepted standard in regularity
and

soundness

of

form

or

structure."

Webster's

Third

New

International Dictionary (1976).
Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that BC's
alleged admission of a malfunction was "immaterial" and, pursuant
thereto,

granted

BC f s

summary

judgement

motion

because

the

Plaintiff had a duty to respond to BCfs motion with a Prima Facie
case that the product was "defective and unreasonably dangerous,"
not that it merely malfunctioned. (R. 679, Para. 5; R. 681, Para.
5).
C.

Experts For Both Parties Agree That The Alleged Defect In The
Front Brake Is Not A Probable Cause Of The Alleged Accident.
Only two conclusions can be drawn from the evidence in the

record regarding the implications of the broken or lost brake
spring referred to by Plaintiff in his Complaint (R. 003): (1) the
loss of the spring would not cause the bike to come to an immediate
stop; and (2) assuming, arguendo, that the brake spring "popped"
off as alleged by Plaintiff, the loss of the spring would not cause
18

the front brake to close on the rim, but instead, would probably
result in the brake pads pulling away from the rim.
BCfs expert, Stephen Henich, testified, by way of affidavit,
that "if the front brake spring were to malfunction, it would not
cause the front tire to instantaneously stop."

(R. 506, Para.

8(b)).
CBC's
affidavit,

expert,
that

Ronald

ff

[t]he

Jay

single

Fisher,
brake

testified,

pad

up

by

against

way
the

of
rim

described by Brian Burns in his deposition would not cause the
wheel to stop, thereby throwing the rider head over heels, off of
the bicycle." (R. 484, Para. 7(b)(1)).
Plaintiff's expert went a step further than either CBC or BC's
experts and told Plaintiff and his friend, Todd Bradford, that if
the spring actually "popped off" as the Plaintiff alleged in his
Complaint, the brake would probably do the exact opposite of what
Plaintiff alleged, to wit: the brake pads would separate away from
the rim and such an occurrence, in his opinion, was not a "probable
cause" of the accident:

Specifically, Mr. Bradford testified:

Q.
What did he say, a spring malfunctioning, or what was his
explanation as to how a spring malfunctioning might cause the
brake to lock up the front wheel without the brake being
activated?
A.

Well, he didn't think that would be the cause.

Q.

Pardon?

A.

He didn't think that was the cause.
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Q.

Oh.

A.
He said if a spring broke, probably released the other
wav. the brakes would not go in, they'd ao out.
Q.
So he discounted a spring malfunctioning as being the
cause of the accident?
A.
In his opinion, he said that he didn't think that was a
probable cause.
(R. 499-500)(emphasis added).
In Freed Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co. . 537 P.2d 1039
(Utah 1983) , the Utah Supreme Court held that a party may not rely
upon allegations in the pleading to counter affidavits made upon
personal knowledge stating facts contrary to those alleged in the
pleadings.

Furthermore, even though summary judgment is reserved

for only the most clear cut negligence cases, as pointed out by
Plaintiff, this Court has previously stated that if there is no
factual support for the allegations, summary judgment should be
affirmed.

Specifically, in Dybowski v. Ernest W. Hahn. Inc., 775

P.2d 445 (Utah App. 1989), this Court said:
Although it is true that summary judgment is reserved for only
the most clear-cut negligence cases, bare contentions,
unsupported bv any specification of facts in support thereof,
raise no material questions of fact as will preclude entry of
summary judgment.
Id. at 446 (quoting Massev v. Utah Power & Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938
(Utah 1980)(emphasis added)).
In this instance, there is no physical evidence, no testimony
based on personal knowledge and no expert testimony which supports
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Plaintiff's allegation that the front brake spring "popped off" or
caused the front tire to lock and cause the bike to come to an
instantaneous

stop.

Instead,

there

are

only

unsupported

allegations and Plaintiff's "feel final" that something was wrong
with the front brake. (R. 156).
The case at hand is much like the case of Brooks v. Colonial
Chevrolet - Buick. 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala. 1991). In Brooks, a husband
and

wife

brought

a

products

liability

action

against

the

manufacturer, General Motors, and a negligent repair cause of
action against the dealer, Colonial Chevrolet - Buick. With regard
to the products liability cause of action, the plaintiffs claimed
a defect in the braking system of the vehicle caused or contributed
to two accidents in which they were involved.

As in Utah, in order

to establish a prima facie case of products liability in Alabama,
plaintiffs must prove that their "injuries and damages proximately
resulted from the product's failure of performance causally related
to its defective condition."

Id. at 1332.

In opposition to General Motors motion for summary judgment,
the plaintiffs in Brooks, like the Plaintiff in the instant matter,
did not produce any expert testimony that the subject accidents
were caused by a defective condition with the brakes. Rather, they
relied on circumstantial evidence and a statement attributed to
Colonial's

service

manager

by

21

the

Plaintiffs

that

"there's

something wrong with the car, but we don't know how to fix it."
Id. at 1330.

However, despite this alleged admission by the

defendants' service manager, the trial court granted defendants'
motions for summary judgment and held:
This court finds as a result of all the information provided
that the technical and mechanical issues involved in [the
Brookses'] allegations are of such a nature that [the
Brookses'] cannot make out a prima facie case and meet their
burden of proof without the submittal of expert testimony with
respect to the claims against both [GM and Colonial.]
Id. at 1329-30, (modifications in original).
On appeal, the Alabama Supreme Court sustained the trial
court's ruling and specifically concluded:
[T]he manufacturer of a product is not an insurer against all
kinds of harm that might be caused by the use of a product,
and the manufacturer or designer is not obligated to produce
an accident-proof or injury-proof product.
* * *

TT]he failure of a product does not presuppose the existence
of a defect. The fact that someone was injured while using a
product does not establish that the product was unreasonably
dangerous when put to its intended use.
* * *

The only evidence the Brookses presented concerning a defect
in design was their own testimony as to the alleged
defectiveness of the brakes and as to the alleged injuries
thev suffered as a result. Such evidence as to the cause of
a product failure amounts to mere speculation and conclusorv
statements; without more, it is insufficient to prove a prima
facie case . . .
Id. at 1330 - 33 (emphasis added).
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The case at hand presents an even more compelling case for
summary judgment than Brooks because the Plaintiff in the instant
matter has failed to produce: (1) any evidence in the form of
personal knowledge supporting his allegation that the Brake spring
"popped off"; (2) any expert testimony which would indicate that
the front tire would lock-up if the Brake spring "popped off;" or
(3) that his accident was otherwise caused by a defect in the front
brake of the Bike.

Conversely, the fact of the matter is that the

Plaintiff consulted with an expert and that expert informed him
that the Brake was not the "probable cause" of the accident (R.
499-500).
Thus, contrary to Plaintiff's attorney's testimony in his
affidavit

offered

in

opposition

to

BC's

motion

for

summary

judgement wherein he stated that he could not obtain affidavits
from experts opposing BC and CBC's motions for summary judgment,3
the fact of the matter is Mr. Wells chose not to use his expert's
testimony because it contradicted Plaintiff's theory of liability.
Plaintiff's case is based on nothing more than unsubstantiated
speculation

and,

quoting

"feel[s]". (R. 156).

the

Plaintiff

himself,

something

he

In accordance with the authorities cited

above, summary judgment in favor of BC should be affirmed.

See R. 590 - 591.
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POINT II
PLAINTIFF'S BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY CAUSE OF ACTION
SHOULD FAIL FOR THE SAME REASON AS HIS
PRODUCT8 LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION
In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 P.2d 152
1979), the Utah Supreme Court acknowledged that:
The elements of both actions [i.e. products liability and
breach of implied warranty] are essentially the same and
analysis for purpose of determining defenses to breach
of implied warranty parallels that for strict products
liability. Therefore, the same defenses discussed under
strict products liability are available under breach of
implied warranty.
Id. at 159. (emphasis added).
In light of Hahn,

Plaintiff's cause of action for breac

implied warranty should fail for the same reasons that his prod
liability cause of action fails.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF'S CAUSE OF ACTION BREACH OF EXPRESS
WARRANTY SHOULD FAIL BBCAU8E THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE OF A DEFECTIVE FRONT BRAKE
Presumably,

the

basis

for Plaintiff's

breach

of exp

warranty cause of action against BC are oral representations
regarding the quality of the Bike made by Phil Blomquist, the oi
of BC. Specifically, Plaintiff testified that he and Mr. Blomqp
discussed the following matters during the sales process:
Q.
A.

What if anything did he tell you about this bike?
Well, I remember kind of how he sold me on it was
that the frame was unique to other bikes as far as
the strength in it and the crank that it had, that
would not flex, also that the frame and the crank
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itself would give me the most direct power to the
rear wheel, and the brakes were the latest thing
out, and then the weight, it was light even though
it had this super strong frame.
(R. 502).
However, the record is devoid of evidence that the Bike's
frame, crank, or brakes were defective, improperly
malfunctioned

or

operated

Blomquist's representations.

inconsistently

with

any

assembled,
of

Phil

Consequently, Plaintiff's breach of

express warranty was properly dismissed.
POINT IV
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE SUBJECT
ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY A DEFECT IN THE BICYCLE.
HIS NEGLIGENT ASSEMBLY CAUSE OF ACTION WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED
It is well recognized that the mere fact an accident occurred,
considered alone, does not support an inference that a defendant
was negligent.

See Williams v. Oaden Union Rv. & Depot Co.. 230

P.2d 315 (Utah 1951); Horslev v. Robinson. 186 P.2d 592 (Utah
1947); JIFU 16.6. As there is no evidence that the subject bicycle
was defective at the time of the accident or that a defect was the
proximate cause of the accident, Plaintiff's negligent assembly
cause of action was properly dismissed by the trial court.
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POINT V
PLAINTIFF'S SPOLIATION CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE THERE IS NO
EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD INDICATING THAT THE ALLEGED
DEFECT IN THE BRAKE COULD HAVE CAUSED THE SUBJECT ACCIDENT
AND THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT BC INTENTIONALLY DISCARDED THE
EVIDENCE
An examination of Plaintiff's spoliation argument reveals that
his argument is without merit.
First, Plaintiff incorrectly asserts in his brief that:
As a general rule, the destruction of or spoliation of
relevant evidence raises and inference that the evidence would
have been unfavorable to the case of the spoliator, [citations
omitted].
(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16).
Second, Plaintiff couples his interpretation of the law with
a misstatement of the trial court's position when he asserts that
the trial court found admissible evidence to support the claim that
BC

(through Mr. Blomquist) admitted

a

"defective" part was

discarded. (Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16).
A.

The Trial Court Granted BC's Motion For Summary Judgement
Because Even If It Was Assumed That The Brake Assembly Was
Discarded, There Was No Evidence To Support Plaintiff's Claim
That A Defect In the Brake Could Cause The Subject Accident.
The trial court's order of summary judgment stated, in

pertinent part, that:
Plaintiff's counsel acknowledged during oral argument that he
could not prove any specific defect of the braking assembly of
the bicycle without the alleged missing part. Therefore, the
court finds that the Plaintiff cannot prove a products
liability, breach of implied warranty, breach of express
warranty or negligence cause of action against The Bicycle
Center.
* * *
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Plaintiff cannot prove a case of spoliation of evidence under
the facts of Plaintiff's case without obtaining expert
testimony stating that the missing part could have, under the
circumstances, produced the accident described bv Plaintiff if
the part were defective and unreasonable dangerous or
negligently installed.
The Plaintiff did not produce any such expert testimony.
Therefore, the court holds that Plaintiff has not established
a factual basis for his claim of spoliation of evidence
* * *

The record before the court contains admissible evidence to
the
effect
that
the brakes
on
Plaintiff's
bicycle
malfunctioned, and that the malfunction caused the accident.
The court concludes that this evidence is not material, and,
therefore, does not create a material issue of fact, (R. 682683)(emphasis added).
The
competent

trial

court

demanded

evidence that would

that

the

show that

Plaintiff

introduce

the part purportedly

discarded was, in some manner, material to the establishment of the
Plaintiff's assorted causes of action.

However, not only did the

Plaintiff fail to introduce any expert testimony showing how the
allegedly discarded part, if defective, could have caused the
accident, the Plaintiff did not introduce any material evidence in
support of any cause of action set-forth in his Complaint.4
B.

In Order To Obtain A Favorable Inference Under A Theory Of
Spoliation. There Must Be Evidence That The Spoliator Had
Notice Of A Duty To Preserve the Evidence.

4

As pointed out previously, this is not simply a case
where the Plaintiff could not find an expert who could support
Plaintiff's theory of liability. Conversely, Plaintiff contacted
and expert and was advised that a defect in the brake assembly was
not a "probable cause" of the alleged accident. (R. 499-500).
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The cases cited by Plaintiff in support of his assertion that
the "general rule"5 is that "the destruction of or spoliation of
relevant evidence raises an inference that the evidence would have
been unfavorable to the position of the spoliator"6 do not apply
to the above-captioned matter.
In each case cited by Plaintiff, the alleged spoliator had
notice of the opposing party's claim andf nevertheless, destroyed
documents and/or evidence essential to the proper adjudication of
outstanding claims. As a result, the court concluded in each case
cited by the Plaintiff that the destruction of the evidence was
"purposeful," "wrongful" and/or "illegal."
For example, Plaintiff cites the case of National Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors v. Turnaae, 115 F.R.D. 543 (N.D. Cal. 1987). In
Turnaae. the plaintiff

sought

sanctions against the Veteran's

Administration ("VA") because of the destruction of discoverable
documents.

The VA had been involved in litigation for more than

three years and knew the destroyed documents were responsive to
outstanding discovery requests of the plaintiff.
distinguishable

from

the

instant

matter

in

Thus, Turnaae is

three

significant

respects: (1) the destroyed evidence in Turnaae was destroyed long
after litigation had commenced

whereas the evidence

5

Plaintiff's Brief, p. 16.

6

Id.
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allegedly

discarded

in

the

instant

matter

was

discarded

years

before

litigation was threatened or contemplated by the Plaintiff; (2) the
evidence

destroyed

in

Turnaae

was

directly

outstanding discovery requests whereasf

responsive

to

in the instant matterf

there were not only no outstanding discovery requests when the part
was allegedly
litigation

had

Plaintiff; and

discarded
not

by BC, but,

been

commenced

as indicated
or

even

previously,

contemplated

by

(3), because the defendant in Turnaae destroyed

documents that were responsive to outstanding discovery requests,
the plaintiff was seeking sanctions against the VA pursuant to
Rules 11 and 26 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure whereas the
Appellant in the present matter was attempting to create a genuine
issue of material fact in hopes of defeating summary judgment.
Thus, in view of the differences between the instant matter
and Turnaae, it is no wonder that the Plaintiff omitted from his
brief the court's explanation as to why it permitted an inference
that the destroyed evidence would have favored the plaintiff.

In

pertinent part, the court stated:
[T]he defendant knew of should have known that these destroyed
materials were relevant and discoverable. After more than
three years of litigation, the VA can hardly assert that it
was not on notice of the issues involved in this lawsuit. It
is no defense to suggest, as the defendant attempts, that
particular employees were not on notice. To hold otherwise
would permit an agency, corporate officer, or legal department
to shield itself from discovery obligations by keeping
employees ignorant.
The obligation to retain discoverable
materials is an affirmative one; it requires that an agency or
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corporate officers having notice of discovery obligations
communicate those obligations to employees in possession of
discoverable materials.
Id. at 557-58 (emphasis added).
Similarly,

in relying on Nation-wide Check Corp, Inc. v.

Forrest Hills Distributors, Inc.. 692 F.2d 214 (1st Cir. 1982) # the
Plaintiff

again

failed

to

note

that

Nation-wide

involved

a

situation where, 10 days after the litigation was commenced, the
defendants elected to discard all documents in their possession
which would have facilitated the plaintiff's case.7

In explaining

the favorable inferences subsequently granted to the plaintiff, the
court stated:
The inference depends, of course, on a showing that the party
had notice that the documents were relevant at the time he
failed to produce them or destroyed them. The adverse
inference is based on two rationales, one evidentiary and one
not.
The evidentiary rationale is nothing more than the
common sense observation that a party who has notice that a
document is relevant to litigation and who proceeds to destroy
the document is more likely to have been threatened by the
document than is a party in the same position who does not
destroy the document.
* * *

7

Specifically, the court in Nation-wide stated "[the
defendant] knew as early as December 1974, from his communications
with Nation-wide's attorney, that the business records might be
needed to trace the money order funds into the hands of the
assignees." The court concluded that while [the defendant] had not
acted in actual bad faith, he had "intentionally discarded" the
documents "in knowing disregard of the plaintiff's claims." Id. at
217 (emphasis added).
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The other rationale for the inference has to do with its
prophylactic and punitive effects. Allowing the trier of fact
to draw the inference presumably deters parties from
destroying relevant evidence before it can be introduced at
trial.
Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
In May v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596

(Ala. 1982) , a medical

malpractice - wrongful death action, the court allowed a favorable
inference in favor of the plaintiff because "[p]roof may be made
concerning

a

party

purposefully

and

wrongfully

destroying

a

document which he knew was supportive of the interested opponent."
Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
Finally,

even

if we were to assume,

arguendo, that the

Plaintiff was able to show that BC intentionally and willfully
discarded

the

allegedly

defective

Brake

assembly,

BC

would,

nevertheless, be entitled to summary judgment because the Plaintiff
has failed to introduce any other evidence which might support the
causes

of

action

set-forth

in

his

complaint.

American

Jurisprudence states:
Such a presumption or inference arises, however, only where
the spoliation or destruction was intentional, and indicated
fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and it does not
arise where the destruction was a matter of routine with no
fraudulent intent.
* * *

While the spoliation of evidence may raise a presumption
or inference against the party guilty of such act, it does not
relieve the other party from introducing evidence tending
affirmatively to prove his case, insofar as he has the burden
of proof. This presumption or inference does not amount to
substantive proof and cannot take the place of proof of a fact
necessary to the other party's cause.
Am. Jur. 2d. Evidence §177, 220-21 (citations omitted)(emphasis
added).

In the case at bar, Plaintiff's spoliation claim fails because
the evidence is that Mr. Blomquist and BC were only asked to repair
the Plaintiff's bicycle. (R. 558).

There is no evidence in the

record that: (1) BC intentionally or willfully destroyed evidence;
(2) anyone asked Mr. Blomquist to retain any parts he may have
replaced in repairing the Bike; (3) BC was aware that Plaintiff was
contemplating litigation at the time he requested the repairs; or
(4) the Plaintiff has any other information to support his claims
that the defective part which was allegedly discarded proximately
caused the accident.
Based on the foregoing, the Plaintiff cannot state a Prima
Facie case of spoliation of evidence against BC and, as a result,
this Court should affirm summary judgment in favor of BC.
POINT VI
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SHOW GOOD CAUSE AND
EVIDENCE OF SPECIFIC DAMAGE LIKELY TO
RESULT FROM DISCLOSURE OF BUSINESS RECORDS.
In reviewing a trial court's conclusion of law, the Court of
Appeals applies a correction
deference to the trial court.

of error standard

and gives no

Marchant v. Park City. 771 P.2d 677

(Utah App. 1989), granted 779 P.2d 688, affirmed 788 P.2d 520
(1990).
The basis for the Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order is
two-fold: First, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a
32

protective order pursuant to Rule 26(c) (7) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. (R. 375). Rule 26(c)(7) states "[t]hat a trade
secret or other confidential research, development, or commercial
information not be disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated
way. . ."

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c)(7).

Second, Plaintiff contends that he is entitled to a protective
order based on a stipulation agreed to by the parties during the
Plaintiff's deposition. (R. 375)
However, Plaintiff's arguments are without merit.

First,

Plaintiff is not entitled to a protective order under Rule 26(c) (7)
because he has not shown "good cause" as required by the Rule
26(c).

Second, in arguing that the parties stipulated that "[a]11

information received from Dr. Burns and Burns Chiropractic Clinic
regarding

business

practices"

was

to

be

kept

confidential,

Plaintiff misstates the actual stipulation agreed to by the parties
during Plaintiff's deposition.
A.

In Order To Obtain A Protective Order Pursuant To Rule 26(c)
Of The Utah Rules Of Civil Procedure, The Moving Party Must
Show Good Cause.
Rule 26(c) specifically provides that:
[U]pon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, and for good cause shown, may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or
person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,or undue
burden or expense . . .

Utah R. Civ. P. 26(c) (emphasis added).

33

The critical language in Rule 26(c) is "for good cause shown."
Despite the requirement that the moving party show good cause, the
Plaintiff's

Motion

for

information

explaining

Protective
why

the

Order

did

business

not

records

Chiropractic Clinics should be kept confidential.

provide
of

any

Burns'

(R. 378). The

Plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order made no showing of "good
cause" whatsoever, but merely requested

protection pursuant to

Rule 26(c)(7) without any elaboration whatsoever. (R. 378).
In Turick by Turick v. Yamaha Motor Corp., USA. 121 F.R.D. 32
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) , the defendants moved to dismiss a protective order
and to compel discovery in a products liability action arising out
an accident involving an all-terrain vehicle.

In that case, the

defendant made a Motion for a Protective Order, pursuant to Rule
26(c) of the Federal rules of Civil Procedure, ostensibly to limit
the

dissemination

of

its

purported

trade

secrets

and

other

confidential research, development, and commercial information that
may have been produced during litigation.

However, The District

Court held that "[p]urported trade secrets and other confidential
commercial

information

disclosure.

Id.

enioy

no

automatic

protection

from

at 35 (citing United States v. IBM. 67 F.R.D. 40,

42, n.l (1975) (emphasis added).

The court went further and noted

that:
In order to show that certain designated information
should be protected under Rule 26(c) this court requires
the party seeking such a protective order to show: (1)
that the information rises to the level of a trade secret
[citations omitted], and (2) that there is good cause to
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protect the information [citations omitted]. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 26(c).
To determine whether the information a party seeks to protect
rises to the level of trade secret this court has adopted the
following factors set forth in Section 757 of the Restatement
of Torts: (1) the extent to which the information is known
outside the business; (2) the extent to which it is known by
employees and others involved in the business; (3) the extent
of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy of the
information; (4) the value of the information to him and to
his competitors; and (5) the amount of effort or money
expended by him in developing the information; (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly
acquired or duplicated by others.
Id. at 35 (quoting United States v. IBM, 67 F.R.D. 40 (1975)).
In

elaborating

on

the

public

policies

underlying

these

factors, the court said:
The requirement of good cause is based upon one of the
fundamental premises of discovery: Discovery is to be
conducted in the public unless compelling reasons exist for
denying the public access to the proceedings, (citations
omitted) . In this court, to show good cause a party must
demonstrate that disclosure of allegedly
confidential
information will work a clearly defined and very serious
iniurv to his business.
Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
In denying the defendant's motion for a protective order, the
court

concluded

that

the

defendant

"merely

made

conclusory

allegations" in an attorney's affidavit, that disclosure of highly
sensitive
competitive

trade

secret

position

materials
in

the

would

ATV

hurt

market.

the

defendant's

Id.

at

35.

Consequently, the court held that the defendant did not make
the requisite showing that the information rose to the level of
trade secret or that there was good cause shown for the protective
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order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c), and therefore denied the
plaintiff's Motion for Protective Order. Id.
The case at bar presents a situation that is quite similar to
Turick.

Here, the Plaintiff has merely made conclusory assertions

that the business records for the Burns' Chiropractic Clinics
contain trade secrets and confidential business practices that
allegedly require protection.

(R. 378).

The Plaintiff does not

show any "good cause" by demonstrating how the disclosure would
injure his business.

(R. 378).

The party seeking a protective

order has the burden of proof of showing good cause for the order.
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.. 529 F. Supp.
866, 890

(E.D. Pa.)(1981); Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93

F.R.D. 471, 479

(S.D.N.Y. 1982).

In the case at bar, it is

apparent that the Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof.

The

plaintiff "cannot generally rely upon his conclusory statements,
but must present evidence of specific damage likely to result from
disclosure," Rosenblatt v. Northwest Airlines. Inc.. 54 F.R.D. 21,
22-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In Zenith Radio Corp.. the court noted that:
[i]t has also been held that the specific instances where
disclosure will inflict a competitive disadvantage should
be set forth in more than the briefs or the hearsay
allegation of counsel's affidavit, for a protective order
should not issue on that basis alone.
Zenith Radio Corp., 529 F. Supp at 891. (emphasis added).
Therefore, based upon the foregoing case law, this Court
should find that the trial court abused its discretion when it
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granted

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Protective

Order

without

the

requisite showing of "good cause" and evidence of specific damage
likely to result from disclosing the business records of Burns'
Chiropractic Clinics.

BC respectfully requests that this court

reverse the trial court's issuance of a Protective Order in favor
of the Plaintiff.
B.

The Plaintiff Misstates The Scope Of The Stipulation Between
The Parties In Asserting That All Business Records Of The
Plaintiff Were To Be Kept Confidential.
The issue of confidentiality was first raised during the

deposition of the Plaintiff on April 19, 1991. After a discussion
off the record wherein the parties agreed to what matters were to
be kept confidential, the parties then went back on the record and
stated their agreement. Specifically, the parties memorialized the
stipulation as follows:
Mr. Wells: I think we are getting into a situation where we
are going to have some protection if we are going to talk
about this stuff.
Mr. Hansen: I would agree that what your client tells me, his
secrets of good management, not be divulged to any other
person with the exception of the insurance carrier, State
Farm, expert witnesses whom we may retain and members of my
office staff and attorneys who are involved in this
litigation.
Mr. Wells: Would you agree to seal the deposition except for
those persons?
Mr. Hansen: I would agree to seal the deposition.
Mr. Wells:
It will only be used at trial for impeachment
purposes or whatever other purposes are allowed by the rules
and that it will not be shown to or the testimony divulged to
anyone other than the people that you have mentioned and your
carrier of course.
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Mr. Ferguson: I will stipulate to that, to this portion of the
deposition being sealed.
Mr. Hansen.

So Will I.

[An off the record discussion was held]
Mr. Hansen:
Let's go back on the record then and let me
restate what I understand the agreement is. With respect to
the deposition from this point forward, it is agreed by all
counsel and the deponent that the deposition from this point
forward will be sealed with the exception of the employees of
State Farm, employees of Aetna Insurance, employees of the law
firm of Morgan & Hansen, employees of the law firm of —
Mr. Ferguson:

Williams & Hunt.

Mr. Hansen:
and also expert witnesses excluding from the
definition of expert witnesses another chiropractor.
It's
also agreed that before this portion of the deposition is
presented to an expert witness chiropractor, that we will
obtain a court order from the court allowing us to present
this information to a chiropractor, unless of course, you
would stipulate to that, but that's up to you.
Is that
agreed?
Mr. Wells: And with the caveat that the people who by
definition are allowed to see this will —
Mr. Hansen: We will take the responsibility to advise them.
Mr. Wells: — will also be bound not to disclose the contents
to any person to whom it is not allowed to be shown by the
terms of the stipulation.
Mr. Hansen:
Mr. Ferguson:

Correct.
Agreed.

(R. 384-385 & 420-422) (emphasis added).
As set forth above, the terms of the oral stipulation entered
into by counsel on the record during Plaintiff's deposition on
April

19, 1991, pertained

only to the sealed

portion

of the

deposition and did not encompass all business and or financial
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records which may and, in fact, were produced

in response to

subsequent discovery. Nevertheless, in moving for a protective
order, some six months later, on October 29, 1991, Plaintiff
represented to the court that the parties had entered

into a

stipulation pursuant to which the parties agreed to keep "[ajJJL
information received from Dr. Burns or Burns Chiropractic Clinic
regarding business practices would be used only in conjunction with
the

litigation11

and

would

otherwise

be

kept

confidential.

Specifically, Plaintiff's counsel testified, by way of affidavit
dated December 5, 1991, that:
At the deposition of Brian Burns held April 19, 1991, counsel
for defendant agreed, in on the record and off the record
discussions, that if Dr. Burns would agree to divulge
information on his business practices the information would be
treated as confidential.
Counsel agreed that with respect to business information
provided, counsel would treat the information as follows:
a)
All information received from Dr. Burns or Burns
Chiropractic Clinic regarding business practices would be used
only in conjunction with the litigation.
b)
Such information would only be revealed or shown to
attorneys, paralegal and expert witnesses working the case and
would not be revealed to clients.
c)
The attorneys, paralegal and expert witnesses to whom
information is given shall be bound by the terms of the
stipulation and any order of the court entered pursuant to
this stipulation.
When litigation is complete all records produced or
information received is to be returned to plaintiff and/or
destroyed.
(R.435-436; See also R. 378-379).
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In comparing the discussion of each parties attorney during
the deposition of Plaintiff and the affidavit subsequently filed by
Plaintiff's counsel

in support of Plaintiff's motion

for a

protective order, it is clear that Plaintiff misstates the
agreement of the parties.

Accordingly, because the parties only

agreed to seal a portion of the deposition, and not all documents
produced in the normal course of discovery, Plaintiff is not
entitled to a protective order because of the stipulation set-forth
in Plaintiff's deposition.
POINT VII
THE PLAINTIFF HAS WAIVED ANY CLAIM FOR CONFIDENTIALITY
IN THE DOCUMENTS BY PRODUCING THEM IN ADVANCE OF
A PROTECTIVE ORDER.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) contemplates that a
protective order will be issued before the materials sought to be
protected are produced.

Specifically, Rule 26(C)(7) states "that

a trade secret or other confidential research, development, or
commercial information not be disclosed . . . " Utah R. Civ. P.
26(c)(7).
In the case at bar, the discovery took place in August and
September of 1991.

(R. 398). The Motion for Protective Order was

not filed until October 29, 1991, long after the Plaintiffs
business records had been produced. (R. 397).
In Gold Standard v. American Resources.

805 P.2d 164 (Utah

1990), the Utah Supreme Court held that the defendant (Getty)
waived its work product protection by inadvertently disclosing
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information to the plaintiff.
producing

memoranda

in

The Court noted that by voluntarily

response

to

plaintiff's

demand

for

production of documents, the defendant waived his right to the
protection afforded work products.

Id.

at 171.

In that case,

which is analogous to the case at bar, the defendant waited to file
its Motion for Protective Order until after the documents were
already produced to the plaintiff.

The court stated that

lf

[t]he

inaction and delay in filing constitute an independent waiver of
whatever right Getty may have been able to assert, and the trial
judge should have so found."

Id. at 172.

Although Gold Standard involved work product protection, the
analogy can be made that by failing to demonstrate diligence in
procuring

a

protective

order

for

confidential

information,

disclosing such information prior to securing a protective order,
is in fact a waiver of that privilege.
that

is

exactly

what

the plaintiff

And in the case at bar,
did

by

not

procuring

a

protective order prior to disclosing the business records of Burns
Chiropractic Clinic.
POINT VIII
THE COURT AND COUNSEL, AS OFFICERS OF THE COURT,
HAVE A DUTY TO DISCLOSE TO THE APPROPRIATE AGENCIES,
INFORMATION FOUND IN DOCUMENTS PRODUCED, WHICH PROVIDES A PRIMA
FACIE CASE OF THE VIOLATION
OF THE LAW8 OF THE 8TATE OF UTAH,
In the Plaintiff's deposition taken on April 19, 1991, the
Plaintiff was asked by defense counsel the following questions
and gave the following responses:
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Q:

Do you have any type of partnership arrangement with
Dr. Morrow?

A:

No.

Q:

Any fee sharing arrangements?

A:

No. We were originally going tof but it didn't pan out.

(R. 414).
The documents which the plaintiff seeks to keep
confidential illustrate that Burns Chiropractic Clinics, Inc.,
paid tof or received from Dr. Morrow the following amounts in the
following years:
1988:

$52,383.91 [Burns to Morrow]

1989:

$43,170.00 [Morrow to Burns]
$ 1,309.70 [Burns to Morrow]

1990:

$38,302.68 [Morrow to Burns]

The documents show that a portion of this money was paid
pursuant to a fee-sharing agreement.

The fee-sharing agreement

was that Dr. Burns paid Dr. Morrow 20% of the fee he received
from the patients who were referred by Dr. Morrow to Dr. Burns.
(R.400).
This type of fee-sharing arrangement is in violation of
State statute, which the Department of Professional Licensing
will investigate and, if determined to be accurate, will
prosecute.

The penalty that may be issued by the Board of

Professional Licensing includes suspension, revocation, or
refusal to renew any license.
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The statute that applies to a chiropractor is 58-12-53(15)
(1990), which provides as follows: "Unprofessional conduct" in
relation to the practice of chiropractic, includes:
(15) Any conduct or practicef contrary to the
recognized standards of ethics of the chiropractic
profession, or any conduct or practice which does or
might constitute a danger to the health, welfare or
safety or the patient or public, or any conduct,
practice or condition which does or might impair the
ability to practice chiropractic safely and skillfully.
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-52 (1990), provides as follows
in pertinent part:
(1) The director of the division, upon the written
recommendation of the board, may suspend, revoke or
refuse to renew any license to practice chiropractic in
this State, or may place the licensee on probation in
the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct;
With respect to Dr. Morrow, who is an orthopedic surgeon,
the following statutes apply:
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-35(1) (1990).
(1) The director upon the written recommendation of
the board, shall deny an application for a license to
practice medicine or shall discipline a physician
licensed or otherwise lawfully practicing in this State
in the following cases:
(a) If the applicant or licensee is not of good moral
character or has been guilty of unprofessional conduct
as defined in this Act;
Utah Code Ann. 58-12-36(9) (1990) provides in
relevant part as follows:
"Unprofessional conduct" as relating to the practice of
medicine includes:
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(9) Aiding and abetting the practice of medicine
by one not licensed or by one whose license is
suspended; or practicing as a partner-agentf or
employee of, or in joint venture with, any person who
does not hold a license to practice medicine within
this State;
Attached as Exhibit "A" is a letter from the Department of
Professional Licensing stating that a fee-sharing agreement
between a physician and chiropractor is a violation of Utah law,
which the Department of Professional Licensing will investigate,
and where appropriate, prosecute.

The documents which Plaintiff

attempts to keep confidential provide the basis for the
Department of Professional Licensing to investigate and prosecute
both Dr. Burns and Dr. Morrow.
"Lawyers, including judges, have a duty to report
unprofessional conduct to the appropriate authorities."
Blacknell v. State, 502 N.E. 2d 899.

See

The Code of Judicial

Administration states in pertinent part:
Cannon 3 - A judge should perform duties of the office
impartially and diligently.
(A) Adjudicative Responsibilities
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence in it.
The Court and counsel for the defendants have a duty, as
officers of the court, to disclose to the appropriate
authorities, information found in documents produced which states
a prima facie case of unlawful activity.
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As officers of the

court, the trial judge and respective counsel must be faithful
and uphold the laws of the State of Utah.
Because these same documents call into question the
truthfulness of Dr. Burns' statement in his deposition that there
was no fee sharing arrangement between he and Dr. Morrow, these
documents should also be forwarded to the Salt Lake County
Attorney's Office for their review on the issue of whether or not
Dr. Burns should be prosecuted for perjury.
CONCLUSION
BC respectfully submits that the trial court's granting of
summary judgment in its favor should be affirmed. BC also
requests that this Court overturn the trial court's protective
order.
Respectfully submitted this 30

day of March, 1993.
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Cross-Appellant The Bicycle Center
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